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Abstract. Fermat, Leibniz, Euler, and Cauchy all used one or
another form of approximate equality, or the idea of discarding
“negligible” terms, so as to obtain a correct analytic answer. Their
inferential moves find suitable proxies in the context of modern the-
ories of infinitesimals, and specifically the concept of shadow. We
give an application to decreasing rearrangements of real functions.
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1. Introduction
The theories as developed by European mathematicians prior to 1870
differed from the modern ones in that none of them used the modern
theory of limits. Fermat develops what is sometimes called a “precal-
culus” theory, where the optimal value is determined by some special
condition such as equality of roots of some equation. The same can be
said for his contemporaries like Descartes, Huygens, and Roberval.
Leibniz’s calculus advanced beyond them in working on the deriva-
tive function of the variable x. He had the indefinite integral whereas
his predecessors only had concepts more or less equivalent to it. Euler,
following Leibniz, also worked with such functions, but distinguished
the variable (or variables) with constant differentials dx, a status that
corresponds to the modern assignment that x is the independent vari-
able, the other variables of the problem being dependent upon it (or
them) functionally.
Fermat determined the optimal value by imposing a condition using
his adequality of quantities. But he did not really think of quantities as
functions, nor did he realize that his method produced only a necessary
condition for his optimisation condition. For a more detailed general
introduction, see chapters 1 and 2 of the volume edited by Grattan-
Guinness (Bos et al. 1980 [19]).
The doctrine of limits is sometimes claimed to have replaced that of
infinitesimals when analysis was rigorized in the 19th century. While
it is true that Cantor, Dedekind and Weierstrass attempted (not alto-
gether successfully; see Ehrlich 2006 [32]; Mormann & Katz 2013 [79])
to eliminate infinitesimals from analysis, the history of the limit con-
cept is more complex. Newton had explicitly written that his ultimate
ratios were not actually ratios but, rather, limits of prime ratios (see
Russell 1903 [89, item 316, p. 338-339]; Pourciau 2001 [84]). In fact,
the sources of a rigorous notion of limit are considerably older than the
19th century.
In the context of Leibnizian mathematics, the limit of f(x) as x tends
to x0 can be viewed as the “assignable part” (as Leibniz may have put
it) of f(x0 + dx) where dx is an “inassignable” infinitesimal increment
(whenever the answer is independent of the infinitesimal chosen). A
modern formalisation of this idea exploits the standard part principle
(see Keisler 2012 [67, p. 36]).
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Figure 1. The standard part function, st, “rounds off” a
finite hyperreal to the nearest real number. The function st
is here represented by a vertical projection. An “infinitesimal
microscope” is used to view an infinitesimal neighborhood
of a standard real number r, where α, β, and γ represent
typical infinitesimals. Courtesy of Wikipedia.
In the context of ordered fields E, the standard part principle is the
idea that if E is a proper extension of the real numbers R, then every
finite (or limited) element x ∈ E is infinitely close to a suitable x0 ∈ R.
Such a real number is called the standard part (sometimes called the
shadow) of x, or in formulas, st(x) = x0. Denoting by Ef the collection
of finite elements of E, we obtain a map
st : Ef → R.
Here x is called finite if it is smaller (in absolute value) than some
real number (the term finite is immediately comprehensible to a wide
mathematical public, whereas limited corresponds to correct technical
usage); an infinitesimal is smaller (in absolute value) than every pos-
itive real; and x is infinitely close to x0 in the sense that x − x0 is
infinitesimal.
Briefly, the standard part function “rounds off” a finite element of E
to the nearest real number (see Figure 1).
The proof of the principle is easy. A finite element x ∈ E defines a
Dedekind cut on the subfield R ⊂ E (alternatively, on Q ⊂ R), and the
cut in turn defines the real x0 via the usual correspondence between
4 T. B., E. B., F. H., V. K., K. K., M. K., T. N., D. S., AND S. S.
cuts and real numbers. One sometimes writes down the relation
x ≈ x0
to express infinite closeness.
We argue that the sources of such a relation, and of the standard
part principle, go back to Fermat, Leibniz, Euler, and Cauchy. Leibniz
would discard the inassignable part of 2x+dx to arrive at the expected
answer, 2x, relying on his law of homogeneity (see Section 4). Such
an inferential move is mirrored by a suitable proxy in the hyperreal
approach, namely the standard part function.
Fermat, Leibniz, Euler, and Cauchy all used one or another form
of approximate equality, or the idea of discarding “negligible” terms.
Their inferential moves find suitable proxies in the context of modern
theories of infinitesimals, and specifically the concept of shadow.
The last two sections present an application of the standard part
to decreasing rearrangements of real functions and to a problem on
divergent integrals due to S. Konyagin.
This article continues efforts in revisiting the history and foundations
of infinitesimal calculus and modern nonstandard analysis. Previous
efforts in this direction include Bair et al. (2013 [6]); Bascelli (2014 [7]);
B laszczyk et al. (2013 [15]); Borovik et al. (2012 [16], [17]); Kanovei et
al. (2013 [55]); Katz, Katz & Kudryk (2014 [61]); Mormann et al. (2013
[79]); Sherry et al. (2014 [92]); Tall et al. (2014 [97]).
2. Methodological remarks
To comment on the historical subtleties of judging or interpreting
past mathematics by present-day standards,1 note that neither Fer-
mat, Leibniz, Euler, nor Cauchy had access to the semantic founda-
tional frameworks as developed in mathematics at the end of the 19th
and first half of the 20th centuries. What we argue is that their syn-
tactic inferential moves ultimately found modern proxies in Robinson’s
framework, thus placing a firm (relative to ZFC)2 semantic foundation
underneath the classical procedures of these masters. Benacerraf (1965
[10]) formulated a related dichotomy in terms of mathematical practice
vs mathematical ontology.
For example, the Leibnizian laws of continuity (see Knobloch 2002
[69, p. 67]) and homogeneity can be recast in terms of modern con-
cepts such as the transfer principle and the standard part principle
over the hyperreals, without ever appealing to the semantic content
1Some reflections on this can be found in (Lewis 1975 [76]).
2The Zermelo–Fraenkel Set Theory with the Axiom of Choice.
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of the technical development of the hyperreals as a punctiform contin-
uum; similarly, Leibniz’s proof of the product rule for differentiation
is essentially identical, at the syntactic level, to a modern infinitesimal
proof (see Section 4).
2.1. A-track and B-track. The crucial distinction between syntac-
tic and semantic aspects of the work involving mathematical continua
appears to have been overlooked by R. Arthur who finds fault with
the hyperreal proxy of the Leibnizian continuum, by arguing that the
latter was non-punctiform (see Arthur 2013 [5]). Yet this makes little
difference at the syntactic level, as explained above. Arthur’s brand of
the syncategorematic approach following Ishiguro (1990 [52]) involves
a reductive reading of Leibnizian infinitesimals as logical (as opposed
to pure) fictions involving a hidden quantifier a` la Weierstrass, ranging
over “ordinary” values. This approach was critically analyzed in (Katz
& Sherry 2013 [65]); (Sherry & Katz 2013 [92]); (Tho 2012 [101]).
Robinson’s framework poses a challenge to traditional historiography
of mathematical analysis. The traditional thinking is often dominated
by a kind of Weierstrassian teleology. This is a view of the history of
analysis as univocal evolution toward the radiant Archimedean frame-
work as developed by Cantor, Dedekind, Weierstrass, and others start-
ing around 1870, described as the A-track in a recent piece in these
Notices (see Bair et al. 2013 [6]).
Robinson’s challenge is to point out not only the possibility, but also
the existence of a parallel Bernoullian3 track for the development of
analysis, or B-track for short. The B-track assigns an irreducible and
central role to the concept of infinitesimal, a role it played in the work
of Leibniz, Euler, mature Lagrange,4 Cauchy, and others.
The caliber of some of the response to Robinson’s challenge has been
disappointing. Thus, the critique by Earman (1975 [30]) is marred by
a confusion of second-order infinitesimals like dx2 and second-order
hyperreal extensions like ∗∗R; see (Katz & Sherry 2013 [65]) for a dis-
cussion.
3Historians often name Johann Bernoulli as the first mathematician to have
adhered systematically and exclusively to the infinitesimal approach as the basis
for the calculus.
4In the second edition of his Me´canique Analytique dating from 1811, Lagrange
fully embraced the infinitesimal in the following terms: “Once one has duly captured
the spirit of this system [i.e., infinitesimal calculus], and has convinced oneself of
the correctness of its results by means of the geometric method of the prime and
ultimate ratios, or by means of the analytic method of derivatives, one can then
exploit the infinitely small as a reliable and convenient tool so as to shorten and
simplify proofs”. See (Katz & Katz 2011 [58]) for a discussion.
6 T. B., E. B., F. H., V. K., K. K., M. K., T. N., D. S., AND S. S.
Victor J. Katz (2014 [66]) appears to imply that a B-track approach
based on notions of infinitesimals or indivisibles is limited to “the work
of Fermat, Newton, Leibniz and many others in the 17th and 18th
centuries”. This does not appear to be Felix Klein’s view. Klein for-
mulated a condition, in terms of the mean value theorem,5 for what
would qualify as a successful theory of infinitesimals, and concluded:
I will not say that progress in this direction is impossible,
but it is true that none of the investigators have achieved
anything positive (Klein 1908 [68, p. 219]).
Klein was referring to the current work on infinitesimal-enriched sys-
tems by Levi-Civita, Bettazzi, Stolz, and others. In Klein’s mind,
the infinitesimal track was very much a current research topic; see
Ehrlich (2006 [32]) for a detailed coverage of the work on infinitesimals
around 1900.
2.2. Formal epistemology: Easwaran on hyperreals. Some re-
cent articles are more encouraging in that they attempt a more tech-
nically sophisticated approach. K. Easwaran’s study (2014 [31]), mo-
tivated by a problem in formal epistemology,6 attempts to deal with
technical aspects of Robinson’s theory such as the notion of internal
set, and shows an awareness of recent technical developments, such as
a definable hyperreal system of Kanovei & Shelah (2004 [57]).
Even though Easwaran, in the tradition of Lewis (1980 [77]) and
Skyrms (1980 [94]), tries to engage seriously with the intricacies of
employing hyperreals in formal epistemology,7 not all of his findings are
convincing. For example, he assumes that physical quantities cannot
take hyperreal values.8 However, there exist physical quantities that are
not directly observable. Theoretical proxies for unobservable physical
quantities typically depend on the chosen mathematical model. And
not surprisingly, there are mathematical models of physical phenomena
5The Klein–Fraenkel criterion is discussed in more detail in Kanovei et al. (2013
[55]).
6The problem is concerned with saving philosophical Bayesianism, a popular po-
sition in formal epistemology, which appears to require that one be able to find
on every algebra of doxastically relevant propositions some subjective probabil-
ity assignment such that only the impossible event (∅) will be assigned an ini-
tial/uninformed subjective probability, or credence, of 0.
7For instance, he concedes: “And the hyperreals may also help, as long as we
understand that they do not tell us the precise structure of credences.” (Easwaran
2014 [31], Introduction, last paragraph).
8Easwaran’s explicit premise is that “All physical quantities can be entirely
parametrized using the standard real numbers.” (Easwaran 2014 [31, Section 8.4,
Premise 3]).
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which operate with the hyperreals, in which physical quantities take
hyperreal values. Many such models are discussed in the volume by
Albeverio et al. (1986 [1]).
For example, certain probabilistic laws of nature have been formu-
lated using hyperreal-valued probability theory. The construction of
mathematical Brownian motion by Anderson (1976 [4]) provides a hy-
perreal model of the botanical counterpart. It is unclear why (and
indeed rather implausible that) an observer A, whose degrees of belief
about botanical Brownian motion stem from a mathematical model
based on the construction of mathematical Brownian motion by Wiener
(1923 [104]) should be viewed as being more rational than another ob-
server B, whose degrees of belief about botanical Brownian motion
stem from a mathematical model based on Anderson’s construction of
mathematical Brownian motion.9
Similarly problematic is Easwaran’s assumption that an infinite se-
quence of probabilistic tests must necessarily be modeled by the set of
standard natural numbers (this is discussed in more detail in Subsec-
tion 2.5). Such an assumption eliminates the possibility of modeling it
by a sequence of infinite hypernatural length. Indeed, once one allows
for infinite sequences to be modeled in this way, the problem of assign-
ing a probability to an infinite sequence of coin tosses that was studied
in (Elga 2004 [33]) and (Williamson 2007 [105]) allows for an elegant
hyperreal solution (Herzberg 2007 [48]).
Easwaran reiterates the common objection that the hyperreals are
allegedly “non-constructive” entities. The bitter roots of such an allega-
tion in the radical constructivist views of E. Bishop have been critically
analyzed in (Katz & Katz 2011 [59]), and contrasted with the liberal
views of the Intuitionist A. Heyting, who felt that Robinson’s theory
was “a standard model of important mathematical research” (Heyt-
ing 1973 [51, p. 136]). It is important to keep in mind that Bishop’s
target was classical mathematics (as a whole), the demise of which he
predicted in the following terms:
Very possibly classical mathematics will cease to exist
as an independent discipline (Bishop 1968 [14, p. 54]).
9One paradoxical aspect of Easwaran’s methodology is that, despite his anti-
hyperreal stance in (2014 [30]), he does envision the possibility of useful infinitesi-
mals in an earlier joint paper (Colyvan & Easwaran 2008 [27]), where he cites John
Bell’s account (Bell’s presentation of Smooth Infinitesimal Analysis in [9] involves a
category-theoric framework based on intuitionistic logic); but never the hyperreals.
Furthermore, in the 2014 paper he cites the surreals as possible alternatives to the
real number–based description of the “structure of physical space” as he calls it;
see Subsection 2.5 below for a more detailed discussion.
8 T. B., E. B., F. H., V. K., K. K., M. K., T. N., D. S., AND S. S.
Figure 2. Easwaran’s attempted slaying of the infinites-
imal, following P. Uccello. Uccello’s creature is shown as
inhabiting an infinitesimal neighborhood of 0.
2.3. Zermelo–Fraenkel axioms and the Feferman–Levy model.
In his analysis, Easwaran assigns substantial weight to the fact that
“it is consistent with the ZF [Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory] without the
Axiom of Choice” that the hyperreals do not exist (Easwaran 2014 [30,
Section 8.4]); see Figure 2. However, on the same grounds, one would
have to reject parts of mathematics with important applications. There
are fundamental results in functional analysis that depend on the Ax-
iom of Choice such as the Hahn–Banach theorem; yet no one would sug-
gest that mathematical physicists or mathematical economists should
stop exploiting them.
Most real analysis textbooks prove the σ-additivity (i.e., countable
additivity) of Lebesgue measure, but σ-additivity is not deducible from
ZF, as shown by the Feferman–Levy model; see (Feferman & Levy 1963
[36]); (Jech 1973 [54, chapter 10]). Indeed, it is consistent with ZF that
the following holds:
(∗) the continuum R of real numbers is a countable union R =⋃
n∈NXn of countable sets Xn.
See (Cohen 1966 [26, chapter IV, section 4]) for a description of a model
of ZF in which (∗) holds.10 Note that (∗) implies that the Lebesgue
measure is not countably additive, as all countable sets are null sets
10Property (∗) may appear to be asserting the countability of the continuum.
However, in order to obtain a bijective map from a countable collection of countable
sets to N × N (and hence, by diagonalization, to N), the Axiom of Choice (in
its “countable” version which allows a countably-infinite sequence of independent
choices) will necessarily be used.
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whereas R is not a null set. Therefore, countable additivity of the
Lebesgue measure cannot be established in ZF.
Terence Tao wrote:
By giving up countable additivity, one loses a fair amount
of measure and integration theory, and in particular
the notion of the expectation of a random variable be-
comes problematic (unless the random variable takes
only finitely many values). (Tao 2013 [100])
Tao’s remarks suggest that deducibility from ZF is not a reasonable
criterion of mathematical plausibility by any modern standard.
There are models of ZF in which there are infinitesimal numbers,
if properly understood, among the real numbers themselves. Thus,
there exist models of ZF which are also models of Nelson’s (1987 [82])
radically elementary mathematics, a subsystem of Nelson’s (1977 [81])
Internal Set Theory. Here radically elementary mathematics is an ex-
tension of classical set theory (which may be understood as ZF11 ) by
a unary predicate, to be interpreted as
“. . . is a standard natural number”,
with additional axioms that regulate the use of the new predicate (no-
tably external induction for standard natural numbers) and ensure
the existence of non-standard numbers. Nelson (1987 [82, Appendix])
showed that a major part of the theory of continuous-time stochastic
processes is in fact equivalent to a corresponding radically elementary
theory involving infinitesimals, and indeed, radically elementary prob-
ability theory has seen applications in the sciences; see for example
(Reder 2003 [85]).
In sum, mathematical descriptions of non-trivial natural phenomena
involve, by necessity, some degree of mathematical idealisation, but
Easwaran has not given us a good reason why only such mathematical
idealisations that are feasible in every model of ZF should be accept-
able. Rather, as we have already seen, there are very good arguments
(e.g., from measure theory) against such a high reverence for ZF.
2.4. Skolem integers and Robinson integers. Easwaran recycles
the well-known claim by A. Connes that a hypernatural number leads
to a nonmeasurable set. However, the criticism by Connes12 is in the
11Even though Nelson would probably argue for a much weaker system; see
Herzberg (2013 [49, Appendix A.1]), citing Nelson (2011 [83]).
12Note that Connes relied on the Hahn-Banach theorem, exploited ultrafilters,
and placed a nonconstructive entity (namely the Dixmier trace) on the front cover
of his magnum opus ; see (Katz & Leichtnam 2013 [62]) and (Kanovei et al. 2013
[55]) for details.
10 T. B., E. B., F. H., V. K., K. K., M. K., T. N., D. S., AND S. S.
category of dressing down a feature to look like a bug, to reverse a
known dictum from computer science slang.13 This can be seen as
follows. The Skolem non-standard integers NSko are known to be purely
constructive; see Skolem (1955 [93]) and Kanovei et al. (2013 [55]). Yet
they imbed in Robinson’s hypernaturals NRob:
NSko →֒ NRob. (2.1)
Viewing a purely constructive Skolem hypernatural
H ∈ NSko \ N
as a member of NRob via the inclusion (2.1), one can apply the transfer
principle to form the set
XH = {A ⊂ N : H ∈
∗A},
where ∗A ⊂ NRob is the natural extension of A. The set XH is not
measurable. What propels the set XH ⊂ P(N) into existence is not a
purported weakness of a nonstandard integer H itself, but rather the
remarkable strength of both the  Los´-Robinson transfer principle and
the consequences it yields.
2.5. Williamson, complexity, and other arguments. Easwaran
makes a number of further critiques of hyperreal methodology. His
section 8.1, entitled “Williamson’s Argument”, concerns infinite coin
tosses. Easwaran’s analysis is based on the model of a countable se-
quence of coin tosses given by Williamson [105]. In this model, it is
assumed that
. . . for definiteness, [the coin] will be flipped once per
second, assuming that seconds from now into the future
can be numbered with the natural numbers (Easwaran
2014 [31, section 8.1]).
What is lurking behind this is a double assumption which, unlike other
“premises”, is not made explicit by Easwaran. Namely, he assumes
that
(1) a vast number of independent tests is best modeled by a tem-
poral arrangement thereof, rather than by a simultaneous col-
lection; and
(2) the collection of seconds ticking away “from now [and] into the
future” gives a faithful representation of the natural numbers.
These two premises are not self-evident and some research math-
ematicians have very different intuitions about the matter, as much
13See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Undocumented feature
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of the literature on applied nonstandard analysis (e.g., Albeverio et
al. 1986 [1]; Reder 2003 [85]) illustrates.
It seems that in Easwaran’s model, an agent can choose not to flip
the coin at some seconds, thus giving rise to events like “a coin that is
flipped starting at second 2 comes up heads on every flip”. However, in
all applications we are aware of, this additional structure used to rule
out the use of hyperreals as range of probability functions seems not
to be relevant.
Williamson and Easwaran appear to be unwilling to assume that,
once one decides to use hyperreal infinitesimals, one should also re-
place the original algebra “of propositions in which the agent has cre-
dences” with an internal algebra of the hyperreal setting. In fact, such
an additional step allows one to avoid both the problems raised by
Williamson’s argument in his formulation using conditional probabil-
ity, and those raised by Easwaran in section 8.2 of his paper.
A possible model with hyperreal infinitesimals for an infinite se-
quence of coin tosses is given by representing every event by means
of a sequence {a1, . . . , aN}, where an represents the outcome of the nth
flip and N is a fixed hypernatural number. In this model, consider
the events “an = Heads for n ≤ N”, that we will denote H(1), and
“an = Heads for 2 ≤ n ≤ N”, that we will denote H(2). In such a set-
ting, events H(1) and H(2) are not isomorphic, contrary to what was
argued in (Williamson [105, p. 3]). This is due to the fact that hyper-
natural numbers are an elementary extension of the natural numbers,
for which the formula k 6= k + 1 always holds. Moreover, the proba-
bility of H(1) is the infinitesimal 2−N , while the probability of H(2) is
the strictly greater infinitesimal 2−(N−1), thus obeying the well known
rule for conditional probability.
Easwaran’s section 8.4 entitled “The complexity argument” is based
on four premises. However, his premise 3, to the effect that “all phys-
ical quantities can be entirely parametrized using the standard real
numbers”, is unlikely to lead to meaningful philosophical conclusions
based on “first principles”. This is because all physical quantities can
be entirely parametrized by the usual rational numbers alone, due to
the intrinsic limits of our capability to measure physical quantities. A
clear explanation of this limitation was given by Dowek. In particular,
since
a measuring instrument yields only an approximation
of the measured magnitude, [. . . ] it is therefore impos-
sible, except according to this idealization, to measure
more than the first digits of a physical magnitude. [. . . ]
12 T. B., E. B., F. H., V. K., K. K., M. K., T. N., D. S., AND S. S.
According to this principle, this idealization of the pro-
cess of measurement is a fiction. This suggests the idea,
reminiscent of Pythagoras’ views, that Physics could be
formulated with rational numbers only. We can there-
fore wonder why real numbers have been invented and,
moreover, used in Physics. A hypothesis is that the in-
vention of real numbers is one of the many situations,
where the complexity of an object is increased, so that
it can be apprehended more easily. (Dowek 2013 [29])
Related comments by Wheeler (1994 [103, p. 308]), Brukner & Zeilinger
(2005 [22, p. 59]), and others were analyzed by Kanovei et al. (2013
[55, Section 8.4]). See also Jaroszkiewicz (2014 [53]).
If all physical quantities can be entirely parametrized by using ra-
tional numbers, there should be no compelling reason to choose the
real number system as the value range of our probability measures.
However, Easwaran is apparently comfortable with the idealisation of
exploiting a larger number system than the rationals for the value range
of probability measures. What we argue is that the real numbers are
merely one among possible idealisations that can be used for this pur-
pose. For instance, in hyperreal models for infinite sequence of coin
tosses developed by Benci, Bottazzi & Di Nasso (2013 [11]), all events
have hyperrational probabilities. This generalizes both the case of fi-
nite sequences of coin tosses, and the Kolmogorovian model for infinite
sequences of coin tosses, where a real-valued probability is generated
by applying Caratheodory’s extension theorem to the rational-valued
probability measure over the cylinder sets.
Given Easwaran’s firm belief that “the function relating credences
to the physical is not so complex that its existence is independent
of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory” (see his section 8.4, premise 2), it is
surprising to find him suggesting that
the surreal numbers seem more promising as a device
for future philosophers of probability to use (Easwaran
2014 [31, Appendix A.3]).
However, while the construction of the surreals indeed “is a simulta-
neous generalization of Dedekind’s construction of the real numbers and
von Neumann’s construction of the ordinals”, as observed by Easwaran,
it is usually carried out in the Von Neumann–Bernays–Go¨del set the-
ory (NBG) with Global Choice; see, for instance, the “Preliminaries”
section of (Alling 1987 [3]). The assumption of the Global Axiom of
Choice is a strong foundational assumption.
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The construction of the surreal numbers can be performed within a
version of NBG that is a conservative extension of ZFC, but does not
need Limitation of Size (or Global Choice). However, NBG clearly is
not a conservative extension of ZF; and if one wishes to prove certain
interesting features of the surreals one needs an even stronger version
of NBG that involves the Axiom of Global Choice. Therefore, the
axiomatic foundation that one needs for using the surreal numbers is
at least as strong as the one needed for the hyperreals.
2.6. Infinity and infinitesimal: let both pretty severely alone.
At the previous turn of the century, H. Heaton wrote:
I think I know exactly what is meant by the term zero.
But I can have no conception either of infinity or of the
infinitesimal, and I think it would be well if mathemati-
cians would let both pretty severely alone (Heaton 1898
[47, p. 225]).
Heaton’s sentiment expresses an unease about a mathematical concept
of which one may have an intuitive grasp14 but which is not easily for-
malizable. Heaton points out several mathematical inconsistencies or
ill-chosen terminology among the conceptions of infinitesimals of his
contemporaries. This highlights the brilliant mathematical achieve-
ment of a consistent “calculus” for infinitesimals attained through the
work of Hewitt (1948 [50]),  Los´ (1955 [78]), Robinson (1961 [87]), and
Nelson (1977 [81]), but also of their predecessors like Fermat, Euler,
Leibniz, and Cauchy, as we analyze respectively in Sections 3, 4, 5,
and 6.
3. Fermat’s adequality
Our interpretation of Fermat’s technique is compatible with those
by Strømholm (1968 [95]) and Giusti (2009 [43]). It is at variance with
the interpretation by Breger (1994 [21]), considered by Knobloch (2014
[70]) to have been refuted.
Adequality, or παρισo´της (parisote¯s) in the original Greek of Dio-
phantus, is a crucial step in Fermat’s method of finding maxima, min-
ima, tangents, and solving other problems that a modern mathemati-
cian would solve using infinitesimal calculus. The method is presented
in a series of short articles in Fermat’s collected works. The first arti-
cle, Methodus ad Disquirendam Maximam et Minimam, opens with a
14The intuitive appeal of infinitesimals make them an effective teaching tool.
The pedagogical value of teaching calculus with infinitesimals was demonstrated in
a controlled study by Sullivan (1976 [96]).
14 T. B., E. B., F. H., V. K., K. K., M. K., T. N., D. S., AND S. S.
summary of an algorithm for finding the maximum or minimum value
of an algebraic expression in a variable A. For convenience, we will
write such an expression in modern functional notation as f(a).
3.1. Summary of Fermat’s algorithm. One version of the algo-
rithm can be broken up into six steps in the following way:
(1) Introduce an auxiliary symbol e, and form f(a+ e);
(2) Set adequal the two expressions f(a+e) =AD f(a) (the notation
“=AD” for adequality is ours, not Fermat’s);
(3) Cancel the common terms on the two sides of the adequality.
The remaining terms all contain a factor of e;
(4) Divide by e (see also next step);
(5) In a parenthetical comment, Fermat adds: “or by the highest
common factor of e”;
(6) Among the remaining terms, suppress all terms which still con-
tain a factor of e. Solving the resulting equation for a yields
the extremum of f .
In modern mathematical language, the algorithm entails expanding
the difference quotient
f(a+ e)− f(a)
e
in powers of e and taking the constant term.15 The method (leaving
aside step (5)) is immediately understandable to a modern reader as
the elementary calculus exercise of finding the extremum by solving the
equation f ′(a) = 0. But the real question is how Fermat understood
this algorithm in his own terms, in the mathematical language of his
time, prior to the invention of calculus by Barrow, Leibniz, Newton,
and others.
There are two crucial points in trying to understand Fermat’s rea-
soning: first, the meaning of “adequality” in step (2), and second, the
justification for suppressing the terms involving positive powers of e
in step (6). The two issues are closely related because interpretation
of adequality depends on the conditions on e. One condition which
Fermat always assumes is that e is positive. He did not use negative
numbers in his calculations.16
15Fermat also envisions a more general technique involving division by a higher
power of e as in step (5).
16This point is crucial for our argument below using the transverse ray. Since
Fermat is only working with positive values of his e, he only considers a ray (rather
than a full line) starting at a point of the curve. The convexity of the curve implies
an inequality, which Fermat transforms into an adequality without giving much
explanation of his procedure, but assuming implicitly that the ray is tangent to the
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Fermat introduces the term adequality in Methodus with a reference
to Diophantus of Alexandria. In the third article of the series, Ad Eam-
dem Methodum (Sur la Meˆme Me´thode), he quotes Diophantus’ Greek
term παρισo´της, which he renders following Xylander and Bachet, as
adaequatio or adaequalitas (see A. Weil [102, p. 28]).
3.2. Tangent line and convexity of parabola. Consider Fermat’s
calculation of the tangent line to the parabola (see Fermat [38, p. 122-
123]). To simplify Fermat’s notation, we will work with the parabola y =
x2, or
x2
y
= 1.
To understand what Fermat is doing, it is helpful to think of the
parabola as a level curve of the two-variable function x
2
y
.
Given a point (x, y) on the parabola, Fermat wishes to find the tan-
gent line through the point. Fermat exploits the geometric fact that
by convexity, a point
(p, q)
on the tangent line lies outside the parabola. He therefore obtains an
inequality equivalent in our notation to p
2
q
> 1, or p2 > q. Here q =
y − e, and e is Fermat’s magic symbol we wish to understand. Thus,
we obtain
p2
y − e
> 1. (3.1)
At this point Fermat proceeds as follows:
(i) he writes down the inequality p
2
y−e
> 1, or p2 > y − e;
(ii) he invites the reader to ade´galer (to “adequate”);
(iii) he writes down the adequality x
2
p2
=AD
y
y−e
;
(iv) he uses an identity involving similar triangles to substitute
x
p
=
y + r
y + r − e
where r is the distance from the vertex of the parabola to the
point of intersection of the tangent to the parabola at y with
the axis of symmetry,
curve. But a transverse ray would satisfy the inequality no less than a tangent ray,
indicating that Fermat is relying on an additional piece of geometric information.
His procedure of applying the defining relation of the curve itself, to a point on the
tangent ray, is only meaningful when the increment e is small (see Subsection 3.2).
16 T. B., E. B., F. H., V. K., K. K., M. K., T. N., D. S., AND S. S.
(v) he cross multiplies and cancels identical terms on right and
left, then divides out by e, discards the remaining terms con-
taining e, and obtains y = r as the solution.17
What interests us here are steps (i) and (ii). How does Fermat pass
from an inequality to an adequality? Giusti noted that
Comme d’habitude, Fermat est autant de´taille´ dans les
exemples qu’il est re´ticent dans les explications. On
ne trouvera donc presque jamais des justifications de sa
re`gle des tangentes (Giusti 2009 [43]).
In fact, Fermat provides no explicit explanation for this step. However,
what he does is to apply the defining relation for a curve to points on the
tangent line to the curve. Note that here the quantity e, as in q = y−e,
is positive: Fermat did not have the facility we do of assigning negative
values to variables. Strømholm notes that Fermat
never considered negative roots, and if A = 0 was a
solution of an equation, he did not mention it as it was
nearly always geometrically uninteresting (Strømholm
1968 [95, p. 49]).
Fermat says nothing about considering points y + e “on the other
side”, i.e., further away from the vertex of the parabola, as he does
in the context of applying a related but different method, for instance
in his two letters to Mersenne (see [95, p. 51]), and in his letter to
Bruˆlart [39].18 Now for positive values of e, Fermat’s inequality (3.1)
would be satisfied by a transverse ray (i.e., secant ray) starting at (x, y)
and lying outside the parabola, just as much as it is satisfied by a
tangent ray starting at (x, y). Fermat’s method therefore presupposes
an additional piece of information, privileging the tangent ray over
transverse rays. The additional piece of information is geometric in
origin: he applies the defining relation (of the curve itself) to a point
on the tangent ray to the curve, a procedure that is only meaningful
when the increment e is small.
In modern terms, we would speak of the tangent line being a “best
approximation” to the curve for a small variation e; however, Fermat
does not explicitly discuss the size of e. The procedure of “discarding
the remaining terms” in step (v) admits of a proxy in the hyperreal
context. Namely, it is the standard part principle (see Section 1).
17In Fermat’s notation y = d, y+r = a. Step (v) can be understood as requiring
the expression y
y−e −
(y+r)2
(y+r−e)2 to have a double root at e = 0, leading to the
solution y = r or in Fermat’s notation a = 2r.
18This was noted by Giusti (2009 [43]).
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Fermat does not elaborate on the justification of this step, but he is
always careful to speak of the suppressing or deleting the remaining
term in e, rather than setting it equal to zero. Perhaps his rationale for
suppressing terms in e consists in ignoring terms that don’t correspond
to an actual measurement, prefiguring Leibniz’s inassignable quantities.
Fermat’s inferential moves in the context of his adequality are akin to
Leibniz’s in the context of his calculus; see Section 4.
3.3. Fermat, Galileo, andWallis. While Fermat never spoke of his e
as being infinitely small, the technique was known both to Fermat’s
contemporaries like Galileo (see Bascelli 2014 [7], [8]) and Wallis (see
Katz & Katz [60, Section 24]) as well as Fermat himself, as his corre-
spondence with Wallis makes clear; see Katz, Schaps & Shnider (2013
[63, Section 2.1]).
Fermat was very interested in Galileo’s treatise De motu locali, as we
know from his letters to Marin Mersenne dated apr/may 1637, 10 au-
gust, and 22 october 1638. Galileo’s treatment of infinitesimals in De
motu locali is discussed by Wisan (1974 [106, p. 292]) and Settle (1966
[91]).
Alexander (2014 [2]) notes that the clerics in Rome forbade the doc-
trine of the infinitely small on 10 august 1632 (a month before Galileo
was put on trial over heliocentrism); this may help explain why the
catholic Fermat might have been reluctant to speak of the infinitely
small explicitly.19
In a recent text, U. Felgner analyzes the Diophantus problems which
exploit the method of παρισo´της, and concludes that
Aus diesen Beispielen wird deutlich, dass die Verben
πα´ρισoυ˜ν und adaequare nicht ganz dasselbe ausdru¨-
cken. Das griechische Wort bedeutet, der Gleichheit
nahe zu sein, wa¨hrend das lateinische Wort das Erre-
ichender Gleichheit (sowohl als vollendeten als auch als
unvollendeten Prozeß) ausdru¨ckt (Felgner 2014 [37]).
Thus, in his view, even though the two expressions have slightly
different meanings, the Greek meaning “being close to equality” and the
Latin meaning “equality which is reached (at the end of either a finite
or an infinite process),” they both involve approximation. Felgner goes
on to consider some of the relevant texts from Fermat, and concludes
that Fermat’s method has nothing to do with differential calculus and
involves only the property of an auxiliary expression having a double
zero:
19See a related discussion at http://math.stackexchange.com/questions/661999/are-infinitesimals-dangerous
18 T. B., E. B., F. H., V. K., K. K., M. K., T. N., D. S., AND S. S.
Wir hoffen, deutlich gemacht zu haben, dass die fer-
matsche “Methode der Adaequatio” gar nichts mit dem
Differential-Kalku¨l zu hat, sondern vielmehr im Studium
des Wertverlaufs eines Polynoms in der Umgebung eines
kritischen Punktes besteht, und dabei das Ziel verfolgt
zu zeigen, dass das Polynom an dieser Stelle eine dop-
pelte Nullstelle besitzt (ibid.)
However, Felgner’s conclusion is inconsistent with his own textual anal-
ysis which indicates that the idea of approximation is present in the
methods of both Diophantus and Fermat. As Knobloch (2014 [70])
notes, “Fermat’s method of adequality is not a single method but rather
a cluster of methods.” Felgner failed to analyze the examples of tan-
gents to transcendental curves, such as the cycloid, in which Fermat
does not study the order of the zero of an auxiliary polynomial. Fel-
gner mistakenly asserts that in the case of the cycloid Fermat did not
reveal how he thought of the solution: “Wie FERMATsich die Lo¨sung
dachte, hat er nicht verraten.” (ibid.) Quite to the contrary, as Fermat
explicitly stated, he applied the defining property of the curve to points
on the tangent line:
Il faut donc ade´galer (a` cause de la proprie´te´ spe´cifique
de la courbe qui est a` conside´rer sur la tangente)
(see Katz et al. (2013 [63]) for more details). Fermat’s approach in-
volves applying the defining relation of the curve, to a point on a tan-
gent to the curve. The approach is consistent with the idea of approxi-
mation inherent in his method, involving a negligible distance (whether
infinitesimal or not) between the tangent and the original curve when
one is near the point of tangency. This line of reasoning is related to
the ideas of the differential calculus. Note that Fermat does not say
anything here concerning the multiplicities of zeros of polynomials. As
Felgner himself points out, in the case of the cycloid the only polyno-
mial in sight is of first order and the increment “e” cancels out. Fermat
correctly solves the problem by obtaining the defining equation of the
tangent.
For a recent study of 17th century methodology, see the article (Car-
roll et al. 2013 [23]).
4. Leibniz’s Transcendental law of homogeneity
In this section, we examine a possible connection between Fermat’s
adequality and Leibniz’s Transcendental Law of Homogeneity (TLH).
Both of them enable certain inferential moves that play parallel roles
in Fermat’s and Leibniz’s approaches to the problem of maxima and
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minima. Note the similarity in titles of their seminal texts: Methodus
ad Disquirendam Maximam et Minimam (Fermat, see Tannery [98,
pp. 133]) and Nova methodus pro maximis et minimis . . . (Leibniz
1684 [72] in Gerhardt [42]).
4.1. When are quantities equal? Leibniz developed the TLH in or-
der to enable inferences to be made between inassignable and assignable
quantities. The TLH governs equations involving differentials. H. Bos
interprets it as follows:
A quantity which is infinitely small with respect to an-
other quantity can be neglected if compared with that
quantity. Thus all terms in an equation except those
of the highest order of infinity, or the lowest order of
infinite smallness, can be discarded. For instance,
a+ dx = a (4.1)
dx+ ddy = dx
etc. The resulting equations satisfy this [. . . ] require-
ment of homogeneity (Bos 1974 [18, p. 33] paraphrasing
Leibniz 1710 [75, p. 381-382]).
The title of Leibniz’s 1710 text is Symbolismus memorabilis calculi alge-
braici et infinitesimalis in comparatione potentiarum et differentiarum,
et de lege homogeneorum transcendentali. The inclusion of the tran-
scendental law of homogeneity (lex homogeneorum transcendentalis) in
the title of the text attests to the importance Leibniz attached to this
law.
The “equality up to an infinitesimal” implied in TLH was explicitly
discussed by Leibniz in a 1695 response to Nieuwentijt, in the following
terms:
Caeterum aequalia esse puto, non tantum quorum dif-
ferentia est omnino nulla, sed et quorum differentia est
incomparabiliter parva; et licet ea Nihil omnino dici non
debeat, non tamen est quantitas comparabilis cum ip-
sis, quorum est differentia (Leibniz 1695 [73, p. 322])
[emphasis added–authors]
We provide a translation of Leibniz’s Latin:
Besides, I consider to be equal not only those things
whose difference is entirely nothing, but also those whose
difference is incomparably small: and granted that it
20 T. B., E. B., F. H., V. K., K. K., M. K., T. N., D. S., AND S. S.
[i.e., the difference] should not be called entirely Noth-
ing, nevertheless it is not a quantity comparable to those
whose difference it is.
4.2. Product rule. How did Leibniz use the TLH in developing the
calculus? The issue can be illustrated by Leibniz’s justification of the
last step in the following calculation:
d(uv) = (u+ du)(v + dv)− uv
= udv + vdu+ du dv
= udv + vdu.
(4.2)
The last step in the calculation (4.2) depends on the following inference:
d(uv) = udv + vdu+ dudv =⇒ d(uv) = udv + vdu.
Such an inference is an application of Leibniz’s TLH. In his 1701 text
Cum Prodiisset [74, p. 46-47], Leibniz presents an alternative justifica-
tion of the product rule (see Bos [18, p. 58]). Here he divides by dx,
and argues with differential quotients rather than differentials. The
role played by the TLH in these calculations is similar to that played
by adequality in Fermat’s work on maxima and minima. For more de-
tails on Leibniz, see Guillaume (2014 [45]); Katz & Sherry (2012 [64]),
(2013 [65]); Sherry & Katz [92]; Tho (2012 [101]).
5. Euler’s Principle of Cancellation
Some of the Leibnizian formulas reappear, not surprisingly, in his
student’s student Euler. Euler’s formulas like
a + dx = a, (5.1)
where a “is any finite quantity” (see Euler 1755 [35, § § 86,87]) are con-
sonant with a Leibnizian tradition as reported by Bos; see formula (4.1)
above. To explain formulas like (5.1), Euler elaborated two distinct
ways (arithmetic and geometric) of comparing quantities, in the fol-
lowing terms:
Since we are going to show that an infinitely small quan-
tity is really zero, we must meet the objection of why
we do not always use the same symbol 0 for infinitely
small quantities, rather than some special ones. . . [S]ince
we have two ways to compare them, either arithmetic or
geometric, let us look at the quotients of quantities to
be compared in order to see the difference.
If we accept the notation used in the analysis of the
infinite, then dx indicates a quantity that is infinitely
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small, so that both dx = 0 and a dx = 0, where a
is any finite quantity. Despite this, the geometric ra-
tio a dx : dx is finite, namely a : 1. For this reason,
these two infinitely small quantities, dx and a dx, both
being equal to 0, cannot be confused when we consider
their ratio. In a similar way, we will deal with infin-
itely small quantities dx and dy (ibid., § 86, p. 51-52)
[emphasis added–the authors].
Having defined the arithmetic and geometric comparisons, Euler pro-
ceeds to clarify the difference between them as follows:
Let a be a finite quantity and let dx be infinitely small.
The arithmetic ratio of equals is clear: Since ndx = 0,
we have
a± ndx− a = 0.
On the other hand, the geometric ratio is clearly of
equals, since
a± ndx
a
= 1. (5.2)
From this we obtain the well-known rule that the infin-
itely small vanishes in comparison with the finite and
hence can be neglected [with respect to it] [35, §87] [em-
phasis in the original–the authors].
Like Leibniz, Euler considers more than one way of comparing quan-
tities. Euler’s formula (5.2) indicates that his geometric comparison is
procedurally identical with the Leibnizian TLH.
To summarize, Euler’s geometric comparision of a pair of quantities
amounts to their ratio being infinitely close to a finite quantity, as in
formula (5.2); the same is true for TLH. Note that one has a+ dx = a
in this sense for an appreciable a 6= 0, but not for a = 0 (in which case
there is equality only in the arithmetic sense). Euler’s “geometric”
comparison was dubbed “the principle of cancellation” in (Ferraro [40,
pp. 47, 48, 54]).
Euler proceeds to present the usual rules of infinitesimal calculus,
which go back to Leibniz, L’Hoˆpital, and the Bernoullis, such as
a dxm + b dxn = a dxm (5.3)
provided m < n “since dxn vanishes compared with dxm” ([35, § 89]),
relying on his “geometric” comparison. Euler introduces a distinction
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between infinitesimals of different order, and directly computes20 a ratio
of the form
dx± dx2
dx
= 1± dx = 1
of two particular infinitesimals, assigning the value 1 to it (ibid., § 88).
Euler concludes:
Although all of them [infinitely small quantities] are
equal to 0, still they must be carefully distinguished one
from the other if we are to pay attention to their mu-
tual relationships, which has been explained through a
geometric ratio (ibid., § 89).
The Eulerian hierarchy of orders of infinitesimals harks back to Leib-
niz’s work (see Section 4). Euler’s geometric comparision, or “principle
of cancellation”, is yet another incarnation of the idea at the root of
Fermat’s adequality and Leibniz’s Transcendental Law of Homogene-
ity. For further details on Euler see Bibiloni et al. (2006 [13]); Bair et
al. (2013 [6]); Reeder (2013 [86]).
6. What did Cauchy mean by “limit”?
Laugwitz’s detailed study of Cauchy’s methodology places it squarely
in the B-track (see Section 2). In conclusion, Laugwitz writes:
The influence of Euler should not be neglected, with
regard both to the organization of Cauchy’s texts and,
in particular, to the fundamental role of infinitesimals
(Laugwitz 1987 [71, p. 273]).
Thus, in his 1844 text Exercices d’analyse et de physique mathe´matique,
Cauchy wrote:
. . . si, les accroissements des variables e´tant suppose´s in-
finiment petits, on ne´glige, vis-a`-vis de ces accroisse-
ments conside´re´s comme infiniment petits du premier
ordre, les infiniment petits des ordres supe´rieurs au pre-
mier, les nouvelles e´quations deviendront line´aires par
rapport aux accroissements petits des variables. Leibniz
et les premiers ge´ome`tres qui se sont occupe´s de l’analyse
infinite´simale ont appele´ diffe´rentielles des variables leurs
accroissements infiniment petits, . . . (Cauchy 1844 [25,
p. 5]).
20Note that Euler does not “prove that the expression is equal to 1”; such indirect
proofs are a trademark of the (ǫ, δ) approach. Rather, Euler directly computes
(what would today be formalized as the standard part of) the expression.
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Two important points emerge from this passage. First, Cauchy
specifically speaks about neglecting (“on ne´glige”) higher order terms,
rather than setting them equal to zero. This indicates a similarity of
procedure with the Leibnizian TLH (see Section 4). Like Leibniz and
Fermat before him, Cauchy does not set the higher order terms equal
to zero, but rather “neglects” or discards them. Furthermore, Cauchy’s
comments on Leibniz deserve special attention.
6.1. Cauchy on Leibniz. By speaking matter-of-factly about the in-
finitesimals of Leibniz specifically, Cauchy reveals that his (Cauchy’s)
infinitesimals are consonant with Leibniz’s. This is unlike the differen-
tials where Cauchy adopts a different approach.
On page 6 of the same text, Cauchy notes that the notion of deriv-
ative
repre´sente en re´alite´ la limite du rapport entre les ac-
crossements infiniment petits et simultane´s de la fonc-
tion et de la variable (ibid., p. 6) [emphasis added–the
authors]
The same definition of the derivative is repeated on page 7, this time
emphasized by means of italics. Note Cauchy’s emphasis on the point
that the derivative is not a ratio of infinitesimal increments, but rather
the limit of the ratio.
Cauchy’s use of the term “limit” as applied to a ratio of infinitesimals
in this context may be unfamiliar to a modern reader, accustomed to
taking limits of sequences of real numbers. Its meaning is clarified by
Cauchy’s discussion of “neglecting” higher order infinitesimals in the
previous paragraph on page 5 cited above. Cauchy’s use of “limit” is
procedurally identical with the Leibnizian TLH, and therefore similarly
finds its modern proxy as extracting the standard part out of the ratio
of infinitesimals.
On page 11, Cauchy chooses infinitesimal increments ∆s and ∆t,
and writes down the equation
ds
dt
= lim.
∆s
∆t
. (6.1)
Modulo replacing Cauchy’s symbol “lim.” by the modern one “st” or
“sh”, Cauchy’s formula (6.1) is identical to the formula appearing in
any textbook based on the hyperreal approach, expressing the deriva-
tive in terms of the standard part function (shadow).
6.2. Cauchy on continuity. On page 17 of his 1844 text, Cauchy
gives a definition of continuity in terms of infinitesimals (an infinites-
imal x-increment necessarily produces an infinitesimal y-increment).
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His definition is nearly identical with the italicized definition that ap-
peared on page 34 in his Cours d’Analyse (Cauchy 1821 [24]), 23 years
earlier, when he first introduced the modern notion of continuity. We
will use the translation by Bradley & Sandifer (2009 [20]). In his Sec-
tion 2.2 entitled Continuity of functions, Cauchy writes:
If, beginning with a value of x contained between these
limits, we add to the variable x an infinitely small in-
crement α, the function itself is incremented by the dif-
ference f(x+ α)− f(x).
Cauchy goes on to state that
the function f(x) is a continuous function of x between
the assigned limits if, for each value of x between these
limits, the numerical value of the difference f(x+ α)−
f(x) decreases indefinitely with the numerical value of α.
He then proceeds to provide an italicized definition of continuity in the
following terms:
the function f(x) is continuous with respect to x be-
tween the given limits if, between these limits, an in-
finitely small increment in the variable always produces
an infinitely small increment in the function itself.
In modern notation, Cauchy’s definition can be stated as follows. De-
note by
©
x the halo of x, i.e., the collection of all points infinitely close
to x. Then f is continuous at x if
f
(
©
x
)
⊂
©
f(x). (6.2)
Most scholars hold that Cauchy never worked with a pointwise defini-
tion of continuity (as is customary today) but rather required a condi-
tion of type (6.2) to hold in a range (“between the given limits”). It is
worth recalling that Cauchy never gave an ǫ, δ definition of either limit
or continuity (though (ǫ, δ)-type arguments occasionally do appear in
Cauchy). It is a widespread and deeply rooted misconception among
both mathematicians and those interested in the history and philoso-
phy of mathematics that it was Cauchy who invented the modern (ǫ, δ)
definitions of limit and continuity; see, e.g., Colyvan & Easwaran (2008
[27, p. 88]) who err in attributing the formal (ǫ, δ) definition of conti-
nuity to Cauchy. That this is not the case was argued by B laszczyk
et al. (2013 [15]); Borovik et al. (2012 [17]); Katz & Katz (2011 [58]);
Nakane (2014 [80]); Tall et al. (2014 [97]).
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7. Modern formalisations: a case study
To illustrate the use of the standard part in the context of the hy-
perreal field extension of R, we will consider the following problem on
divergent integrals. The problem was recently posed at SE, and is re-
portedly due to S. Konyagin.21 The solution exploits the technique of
a monotone rearrangement g of a function f , shown by Ryff to admit
a measure-preserving map φ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] such that f = g ◦ φ. In
general there is no “inverse” ψ such that g = f ◦ ψ; however, a hyper-
real enlargement enables one to construct a suitable (internal) proxy
for such a ψ, so as to be able to write g = st(f ◦ ψ); see formula (8.2)
below.
Theorem 7.1. Let f be a real-valued function continuous on [0, 1].
Then there exists a number a such that the integral∫ 1
0
1
|f(x)− a|
dx (7.1)
diverges.
A proof can be given in terms of a monotone rearrangement of the
function (see Hardy et al. [46]). We take a decreasing rearrange-
ment g(x) of the function f(x). If f is continuous, then the func-
tion g(x) will also be continuous. If f is not constant on any set of
positive measure, one can construct g by setting
g = m−1 where m(y) = meas{x : f(x) > y}. (7.2)
Ryff (1970 [90]) showed that there exists a measure-preserving trans-
formation22 φ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] that relates f and g as follows:
f(x) = g ◦ φ(x) (7.3)
Finding a map ψ such that g(x) = f ◦ ψ(x) is in general impossible
(see Bennett & Sharpley [12, p. 85, example 7.7] for a counterexample).
This difficulty can be circumvented using a hyperfinite rearrangement
(see Section 8). By measure preservation, we have∫ 1
0
|f(x)− a|−1 dx =
∫ 1
0
|g(x)− a|−1 dx
(for every a).23
21http://math.stackexchange.com/questions/408311/improper-integral-diverges
22However, see Section 8 for a hyperfinite approach avoiding measure theory
altogether.
23Here one needs to replace the function |f(x)− a|−1 by the family of its trun-
cations min
(
C, |f(x)− a|−1
)
, and then let C increase without bound.
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To complete the proof of Theorem 7.1, apply the result that every
monotone function is a.e. differentiable.24 Take a point p ∈ [0, 1] where
the function g is differentiable. Then the number a = g(p) yields an
infinite integral (7.1), since the difference |g(x) − a| can be bounded
above in terms of a linear expression.25
8. A combinatorial approach to decreasing
rearrangements
The existence of a decreasing rearrangement of a function f contin-
uous on [0, 1] admits an elegant proof in the context of its hyperreal
extension ∗f , which we will continue to denote by f .
We present a combinatorial argument showing that the decreasing
rearrangement obeys the same modulus of uniformity as the original
function.26 The argument actually yields an independent construc-
tion of the decreasing rearrangement (see Proposition 8.1) that avoids
recourse to measure theory. It also yields an “inverse up to an infinites-
imal,” ψ (see formula (8.2)), to the function φ such that f = g ◦φ. For
a recent application of combinatorial arguments in a hyperreal frame-
work, see Benci et al. (2013 [11]).
In passing from the finite to the continuous case of rearrangements,
Bennett and Sharpley [12] note that
nonnegative sequences (a1, a2, . . . , an) and (b1, b2, . . . , bn)
are equimeasurable if and only if there is a permutation
σ of {1, 2, . . . , n} such that bi = aσ(i) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
. . . The notion of permutation is no longer available
in this context [of continuous measure spaces] and is re-
placed by that of a “measure-preserving transformation”
(Bennett and Sharpley 1988 [12, p. 79]).
We show that the hyperreal framework allows one to continue work-
ing with combinatorial ideas, such as the “inverse” function ψ, in the
continuous case as well.
24In fact, one does not really need to use the result that monotone functions
are a.e. differentiable. Consider the convex hull in the plane of the graph of the
monotone function g(x), and take a point where the graph touches the boundary
of the convex hull (other than the endpoints 0 and 1). Setting a equal to the y-
coordinate of the point does the job.
25Namely, for x near such a point p, we have |g(x) − a| ≤ (|g′(p)| + 1)|x − p|,
hence 1|g(x)−a| ≥
1
(|g′(p)|+1)|x−a| , yielding a lower bound in terms of a divergent
integral.
26A function f on [0, 1] is said to satisfy a modulus of uniformity µ(n) > 0, n ∈ N,
if ∀n ∈ N ∀p, q ∈ [0, 1]
(
|p− q| ≤ µ(n)→ |f(p)− f(q)| ≤ 1
n
)
.
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Let H ∈ ∗N \ N, let pi =
i
H
for i = 1, 2, . . . , H . By the Transfer
Principle (see e.g., Davis [28]; Herzberg [49]; Kanovei & Reeken [56]),
the nonstandard domain of internal sets satisfies the same basic laws
as the usual, “standard” domain of real numbers and related objects.
Thus, as for finite sets, there exists a permutation ψ of the hyperfinite
grid
GH = {p1, . . . , pH} (8.1)
by decreasing value of f(pi) (here f(ψ(p1)) is the maximal value). We
assume that equal values are ordered lexicographically so that if f(pi) =
f(pj) with i < j then ψ(pi) < ψ(pj). Hence we obtain an internal
function
gˆ(pi) = f(ψ(pi)), i = 1, . . . , H. (8.2)
Here gˆ is (perhaps nonstrictly) decreasing on the grid GH of (8.1).
The internal sequences (f(pi)) and (gˆ(pi)), where i = 1, . . . , H , are
equinumerable in the sense above.
Proposition 8.1. Let f be an arbitrary continuous function. Then
there is a standard continuous real function g(x) such that g(st(pi)) =
st(gˆ(pi)) for all i, where st(y) denotes the standard part of a hyperreal y.
Proof. Let gi = gˆ(pi). We claim that gˆ is S-continuous (microcontinu-
ous), i.e., for each pair i, j = 1, ..., H , if pi − pj is infinitesimal then so
is gˆ(pi)− gˆ(pj). To prove the claim, we will prove the following stronger
fact:
for every i < j there are m < n such that n−m ≤ j− i
and |f(pm)− f(pn)| ≥ gi − gj.
The sets A = {k : f(pk) ≥ gi} and B = {k : f(pk) ≤ gj} are nonempty
and there are at most j−i−1 points which are not in A∪B. Letm ∈ A
and n ∈ B be such that |m − n| is minimal. All integers between m
and n are not in A ∪ B. Hence there are at most j − i − 1 such
integers, and therefore |n −m| ≤ j − i. By definition of A and B, we
obtain |f(pn) − f(pm)| ≥ gi − gj, which proves the claim. Thus gˆ is
indeed S-continuous.
This allows us to define, for any standard x ∈ [0, 1], the value g(x)
to be the standard part of the hyperreal gi for any hyperinteger i
such that pi is infinitely close to x, and then g is a continuous
27 and
(non-strictly) monotone real function equal to the decreasing rearrange-
ment g = m−1 of (7.2). 
27The argument shows in fact that the modulus of uniformity of g is bounded
by that of f ; see footnote 26.
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The hyperreal approach makes it possible to solve Konyagin’s prob-
lem without resorting to standard treatments of decreasing rearrange-
ments which use measure theory. Note that the rearrangement defined
by the internal permutation ψ preserves the integral of f (as well as
the integrals of the truncations of |f(x)− a|−1), in the following sense.
The right-hand Riemann sums satisfy
H∑
i=1
f(pi)∆x =
H∑
i=1
f(ψ(pi))∆x =
H∑
i=1
gˆ(pi)∆x, (8.3)
where ∆x = 1
H
. Thus ψ transforms a hyperfinite Riemann sum of f into
a hyperfinite Riemann sum of gˆ. Since
∫ 1
0
f(x)dx = st
(∑H
i=1 f(pi)∆x
)
and g(st(pi)) = st (gˆ(pi)), we conclude that f and g have the same
integrals, and similarly for the integrals of |f(x)−a|−1; see footnote 23.
The first equality in (8.3) holds automatically by the transfer prin-
ciple even though ψ is an infinite permutation. (Compare with the
standard situation where changing the order of summation in an infi-
nite sum generally requires further justification.) This illustrates one
of the advantages of the hyperreal approach.
9. Conclusion
We have critically reviewed several common misrepresentations of
hyperreal number systems, not least in relation to their alleged non-
constructiveness, from a historical, philosophical, and set-theoretic per-
spective. In particular we have countered some of Easwaran’s recent
arguments against the use of hyperreals in formal epistemology. A hy-
perreal framework enables a richer syntax better suited for expressing
proxies for procedural moves found in the work of Fermat, Leibniz,
Euler, and Cauchy. Such a framework sheds light on the internal co-
herence of their procedures which have been often misunderstood from
a whiggish post-Weierstrassian perspective.
Acknowledgments
The work of Vladimir Kanovei was partially supported by RFBR
grant 13-01-00006. M. Katz was partially funded by the Israel Sci-
ence Foundation grant no. 1517/12. We are grateful to Thomas Mor-
mann and to the anonymous referee for helpful suggestions, and to Ivor
Grattan-Guinness for contributing parts of the introduction.
FERMAT, LEIBNIZ, EULER, AND THE GANG 29
References
[1] Albeverio, S.; Høegh-Krohn, R.; Fenstad, J.; Lindstrøm, T. Nonstandard
Methods in Stochastic Analysis and Mathematical Physics. Pure and Applied
Mathematics, 122. Academic Press, Inc., Orlando, FL, 1986.
[2] Alexander, A. Infinitesimal: How a Dangerous Mathematical Theory Shaped
the Modern World. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014.
[3] Alling, N. Foundations of Analysis over Surreal Number Fields. North-
Holland Mathematical Library, 1987.
[4] Anderson, R. A non-standard representation for Brownian motion and Itoˆ
integration. Israel Journal of Mathematics 25 (1976), no. 1-2, 15–46.
[5] Arthur, R. Leibniz’s syncategorematic infinitesimals. Arch. Hist. Exact Sci.
67 (2013), no. 5, 553–593.
[6] Bair, J.; B laszczyk, P.; Ely, R.; Henry, V.; Kanovei, V.; Katz, K.; Katz, M.;
Kutateladze, S.; McGaffey, T.; Schaps, D.; Sherry, D.; Shnider, S. Is mathe-
matical history written by the victors? Notices of the American Mathemat-
ical Society 60 (2013) no. 7, 886-904.
See http://www.ams.org/notices/201307/rnoti-p886.pdf
and http://arxiv.org/abs/1306.5973
[7] Bascelli, T. Galileo’s quanti: understanding infinitesimal magnitudes. Arch.
Hist. Exact Sci. 68 (2014), no. 2, 121–136.
[8] Bascelli, T. Infinitesimal issues in Galileo’s theory of motion. Revue
Roumaine de Philosophie 58 (2014), no. 1, 23-41.
Tiziana Bascelli, ”Infinitesimal Issues in Galileo’s Theory of Motion”, in Rev.
Roum. Philosophie, 58,
[9] Bell, J. The Continuous and the Infinitesimal in Mathematics and Philoso-
phy. Polimetrica, 2006.
[10] Benacerraf, P. What numbers could not be. Philos. Rev. 74 (1965), 47–73.
[11] Benci, V.; Bottazzi E.; Di Nasso, M. Elementary numerosity and measures,
preprint (2013).
[12] Bennett, C.; Sharpley, R. Interpolation of operators. Pure and Applied Math-
ematics 129. Academic Press, Boston, MA, 1988.
[13] Bibiloni, L.; Viader, P.; Parad´ıs, J. On a series of Goldbach and Euler. Amer.
Math. Monthly 113 (2006), no. 3, 206–220.
[14] Bishop, E. Mathematics as a numerical language. 1970 Intuitionism and
Proof Theory (Proc. Conf., Buffalo, N.Y., 1968) pp. 53–71. North-Holland,
Amsterdam.
[15] B laszczyk, P.; Katz, M.; Sherry, D. Ten misconceptions from the history
of analysis and their debunking. Foundations of Science, 18 (2013), no. 1,
43-74. See http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10699-012-9285-8
and http://arxiv.org/abs/1202.4153
[16] Borovik, A.; Jin, R.; Katz, M. An integer construction of infinitesimals:
Toward a theory of Eudoxus hyperreals.Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
53 (2012), no. 4, 557-570. See http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00294527-1722755
and http://arxiv.org/abs/1210.7475
[17] Borovik, A.; Katz, M. Who gave you the Cauchy–Weierstrass tale? The
dual history of rigorous calculus. Foundations of Science 17 (2012), no. 3,
245-276. See http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10699-011-9235-x
and http://arxiv.org/abs/1108.2885
30 T. B., E. B., F. H., V. K., K. K., M. K., T. N., D. S., AND S. S.
[18] Bos, H. J. M. Differentials, higher-order differentials and the derivative in
the Leibnizian calculus. Arch. History Exact Sci. 14 (1974), 1–90.
[19] Bos, H. J. M.; Bunn, R.; Dauben, J.; Grattan-Guinness, I.; Hawkins, T.;
Pedersen, K. M. From the calculus to set theory, 1630–1910. An introduc-
tory history. Edited by I. Grattan-Guinness. Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd.,
London, 1980.
[20] Bradley, R.; Sandifer, C. Cauchy’s Cours d’analyse. An annotated transla-
tion. Sources and Studies in the History of Mathematics and Physical Sci-
ences. Springer, New York, 2009.
[21] Breger, H. The mysteries of adaequare: a vindication of Fermat. Arch. Hist.
Exact Sci. 46 (1994), no. 3, 193–219.
[22] Brukner, Cˇ.; Zeilinger, A.: Quantum physics as a science of information, in
Quo vadis quantum mechanics?, 47-61, Frontiers Collection, Springer, Berlin,
2005.
[23] Carroll, M.; Dougherty, S.; Perkins, D. Indivisibles, Infinitesimals and a Tale
of Seventeenth-Century Mathematics. Mathematics Magazine 86 (2013),
no. 4, 239–254.
[24] Cauchy, A. L. Cours d’Analyse de L’Ecole Royale Polytechnique. Premie`re
Partie. Analyse alge´brique. Paris: Imprime´rie Royale, 1821. Online at
http://books.google.com/books?id= mYVAAAAQAAJ&dq=cauchy&lr=&source=gbs navlinks s
[25] Cauchy, A. L. Exercices d’analyse et de physique mathe´matique (vol. 3).
Paris, Bachelier, 1844.
[26] Cohen, P. Set theory and the continuum hypothesis. W. A. Benjamin, New
York-Amsterdam, 1966.
[27] Colyvan, M.; Easwaran, K. Mathematical and physical continuity. Australas.
J. Log. 6 (2008), 87–93.
[28] Davis, M. Applied nonstandard analysis. Pure and Applied Mathematics.
Wiley-Interscience [John Wiley & Sons], New York-London-Sydney, 1977.
Reprinted: Dover, NY, 2005, see
http://store.doverpublications.com/0486442292.html
[29] Dowek, G. Real numbers, chaos, and the principle of a bounded density of
information. Invited paper at International Computer Science Symposium in
Russia, 2013. See https://who.rocq.inria.fr/Gilles.Dowek/Publi/csr.pdf
[30] Earman, J. Infinities, infinitesimals, and indivisibles: the Leibnizian laby-
rinth. Studia Leibnitiana 7 (1975), no. 2, 236–251.
[31] Easwaran, K. Regularity and hyperreal credences. Philosophical Review 123
(2014), No. 1, 1–41.
[32] Ehrlich, P. The rise of non-Archimedean mathematics and the roots of a
misconception. I. The emergence of non-Archimedean systems of magnitudes.
Arch. Hist. Exact Sci. 60 (2006), no. 1, 1–121.
[33] Elga, A. Infinitesimal chances and the laws of nature. Australasian Journal
of Philosophy 82 (2004), no. 1, 67-76.
[34] Euler, L. Institutiones Calculi Differentialis. SPb, 1755.
[35] Euler, L. Foundations of Differential Calculus. English translation of Chap-
ters 1–9 of ([34]) by D.Blanton, Springer, N.Y., 2000.
[36] Feferman, S.; Levy, A. Independence results in set theory by Cohen’s method
II. Notices Amer. Math. Soc. 10 (1963), 593.
FERMAT, LEIBNIZ, EULER, AND THE GANG 31
[37] Felgner, U. Der Begriff der ”Angleichung” (παρισo´της , adaequatio) bei Dio-
phant und Fermat (2014), preprint.
[38] Fermat, P. Me´thode pour la recherche du maximum et du minimum. p. 121-
156 in Tannery’s edition [99].
[39] Fermat, P. Letter to Bruˆlart. Oeuvres, Vol. 5, pp. 120-125.
[40] Ferraro, G. Differentials and differential coefficients in the Eulerian foun-
dations of the calculus. Historia Mathematica 31 (2004), no. 1, 34–61. See
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0315-0860(03)00030-2.
[41] Gerhardt:, C. I. (ed.) Historia et Origo calculi differentialis a G. G. Leibnitio
conscripta, ed. C. I. Gerhardt, Hannover, 1846.
[42] Gerhardt, C. I. (ed.) Leibnizens mathematische Schriften (Berlin and Halle:
Eidmann, 1850-1863).
[43] Giusti, E. Les me´thodes des maxima et minima de Fermat. Ann. Fac. Sci.
Toulouse Math. (6) 18 (2009), Fascicule Special, 59–85.
[44] Goldenbaum U.; Jesseph D. (Eds.) Infinitesimal Differences: Controver-
sies between Leibniz and his Contemporaries. Berlin-New York: Walter de
Gruyter, 2008.
[45] Guillaume, M. “Review of Katz, M.; Sherry, D. Leibniz’s infinitesimals: their
fictionality, their modern implementations, and their foes from Berkeley to
Russell and beyond. Erkenntnis 78 (2013), no. 3, 571–625.” Mathematical
Reviews (2014). See http://www.ams.org/mathscinet-getitem?mr=3053644
[46] Hardy, G.; Littlewood, J. Po´lya, G. Inequalities. Second edition. Cambridge
University Press, 1952.
[47] Heaton, H. Infinity, the Infinitesimal, and Zero. American Mathematical
Monthly 5 (1898), no. 10, 224–226.
[48] Herzberg, F. Internal laws of probability, generalized likelihoods and Lewis’
infinitesimal chances—a response to Adam Elga. British Journal for the Phi-
losophy of Science 58 (2007), no. 1, 25-43.
[49] Herzberg, F. Stochastic calculus with infinitesimals. Lecture Notes in Math-
ematics, 2067. Springer, Heidelberg, 2013.
[50] Hewitt, E. Rings of real-valued continuous functions. I. Trans. Amer. Math.
Soc. 64 (1948), 45–99.
[51] Heijting, A. Address to Professor A. Robinson. At the occasion of the
Brouwer memorial lecture given by Prof. A. Robinson on the 26th April
1973. Nieuw Archief voor Wiskunde (3) 21 (1973), 134–137.
[52] Ishiguro, H. Leibniz’s philosophy of logic and language. Second edition. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990.
[53] Jaroszkiewicz, G. Principles of Discrete Time Mechanics. Cambridge Mono-
graphs on Mathematical Physics. Cambridge University Press, 2014.
[54] Jech, T. The axiom of choice. Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Math-
ematics, Vol. 75. North-Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam-London; Amer-
can Elsevier Publishing Co., Inc., New York, 1973.
[55] Kanovei, V.; Katz, M.; Mormann, T. Tools, Objects, and Chimeras: Connes
on the Role of Hyperreals in Mathematics. Foundations of Science 18 (2013),
no. 2, 259–296. See http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10699-012-9316-5
and http://arxiv.org/abs/1211.0244
[56] Kanovei, V.; Reeken, M. Nonstandard analysis, axiomatically. Springer
Monographs in Mathematics, Berlin: Springer, 2004.
32 T. B., E. B., F. H., V. K., K. K., M. K., T. N., D. S., AND S. S.
[57] Kanovei, V.; Shelah, S. A definable nonstandard model of the reals. Journal
of Symbolic Logic 69 (2004), no. 1, 159–164.
[58] Katz, K.; Katz, M. Cauchy’s continuum. Perspectives on Science 19 (2011),
no. 4, 426-452. See http://arxiv.org/abs/1108.4201 and
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/POSC a 00047
[59] Katz, K.; Katz, M. Meaning in classical mathematics: is it at odds with
Intuitionism? Intellectica 56 (2011), no. 2, 223–302. See
http://arxiv.org/abs/1110.5456
[60] Katz, K.; Katz, M. A Burgessian critique of nominalistic tendencies in con-
temporary mathematics and its historiography. Foundations of Science 17
(2012), no. 1, 51–89. See http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10699-011-9223-1
and http://arxiv.org/abs/1104.0375
[61] Katz, K.; Katz, M.; Kudryk, T. Toward a clarity of the extreme value theo-
rem. Logica Universalis 8 (2014), no. 2, 193-214.
See http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11787-014-0102-8
and http://arxiv.org/abs/1404.5658
[62] Katz, M.; Leichtnam, E. Commuting and noncommuting infinitesi-
mals. American Mathematical Monthly 120 (2013), no. 7, 631–641. See
http://dx.doi.org/10.4169/amer.math.monthly.120.07.631
and http://arxiv.org/abs/1304.0583
[63] Katz, M.; Schaps, D.; Shnider, S. Almost Equal: The Method of Adequality
from Diophantus to Fermat and Beyond. Perspectives on Science 21 (2013),
no. 3, 283-324.
See http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/POSC a 00101 and
http://arxiv.org/abs/1210.7750
[64] Katz, M.; Sherry, D. Leibniz’s laws of continuity and homogeneity. Notices
of the American Mathematical Society 59 (2012), no. 11, 1550-1558. See
http://www.ams.org/notices/201211/ and http://arxiv.org/abs/1211.7188
[65] Katz, M.; Sherry, D. Leibniz’s infinitesimals: Their fictional-
ity, their modern implementations, and their foes from Berke-
ley to Russell and beyond. Erkenntnis 78 (2013), no. 3,
571–625. See http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-012-9370-y and
http://arxiv.org/abs/1205.0174
[66] Katz, V. “Review of Bair et al., Is mathematical history written by the
victors? Notices Amer. Math. Soc. 60 (2013), no. 7, 886–904.”Mathematical
Reviews (2014). See http://www.ams.org/mathscinet-getitem?mr=3086638
[67] Keisler, H. J. Elementary Calculus: An Infinitesimal Approach. Second Edi-
tion. Prindle, Weber & Schimidt, Boston, 1986. Revision from february 2012
online at http://www.math.wisc.edu/∼keisler/calc.html
[68] Klein, F. Elementary Mathematics from an Advanced Standpoint. Vol. I.
Arithmetic, Algebra, Analysis. Translation by E. R. Hedrick and C. A. No-
ble [Macmillan, New York, 1932] from the third German edition [Springer,
Berlin, 1924]. Originally published as Elementarmathematik vom ho¨heren
Standpunkte aus (Leipzig, 1908).
[69] Knobloch, E. Leibniz’s rigorous foundation of infinitesimal geometry by
means of Riemannian sums. Foundations of the formal sciences, 1 (Berlin,
1999). Synthese 133 (2002), no. 1-2, 59–73.
FERMAT, LEIBNIZ, EULER, AND THE GANG 33
[70] Knobloch, E. “Review of: Katz, M.; Schaps, D.; Shnider, S. Almost equal:
the method of adequality from Diophantus to Fermat and beyond. Perspec-
tives on Science 21 (2013), no. 3, 283–324.” Mathematical Reviews (2014).
See http://www.ams.org/mathscinet-getitem?mr=3114421
[71] Laugwitz, D. Infinitely small quantities in Cauchy’s textbooks. Historia
Mathematica 14 (1987), no. 3, 258–274.
[72] Leibniz, G. Nova methodus pro maximis et minimis . . . , in Acta Erud., Oct.
1684. See Gerhardt [42], V, pp. 220-226.
[73] Leibniz, G. (1695) Responsio ad nonnullas difficultates a Dn. Bernardo
Niewentiit circa methodum differentialem siu infinitesimalem motas. In Ger-
hardt [42], V, p. 320–328.
[74] Leibniz, G. (1701) Cum Prodiisset . . . mss “Cum prodiisset atque increbuisset
Analysis mea infinitesimalis ...” in Gerhardt [41], pp. 39–50.
[75] Leibniz, G. (1710) Symbolismus memorabilis calculi algebraici et infinitesi-
malis in comparatione potentiarum et differentiarum, et de lege homogeneo-
rum transcendentali. In Gerhardt [42, vol. V, pp. 377-382].
[76] Lewis, A. Bringing modern mathematics to bear on historical research. His-
toria Mathematica 2 (1975), 84-85.
[77] Lewis, D. A subjectivist’s guide to objective chance. In Studies in Inductive
Logic and Probability (ed. Richard C. Jeffrey), pp. 263–293. University of
California Press, 1980.
[78]  Los´, J. Quelques remarques, the´ore`mes et proble`mes sur les classes de´fi-
nissables d’alge`bres. In Mathematical interpretation of formal systems, 98–
113, North-Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam, 1955.
[79] Mormann, T.; Katz, M. Infinitesimals as an issue of neo-Kantian philosophy
of science. HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History
of Philosophy of Science 3 (2013), no. 2, 236-280.
See http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/671348
and http://arxiv.org/abs/1304.1027
[80] Nakane, M. Did Weierstrass’s differential calculus have a limit-avoiding char-
acter? His definition of a limit in ǫ-δ style. BSHM Bulletin: Journal of the
British Society for the History of Mathematics, 29 (2014), no. 1, 51-59. See
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17498430.2013.831241
[81] Nelson, E. Internal set theory: a new approach to nonstandard analysis.
Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 83 (1977), no. 6, 1165–1198.
[82] Nelson, E. Radically elementary probability theory. Annals of Mathematics
Studies, vol. 117. Princeton University Press, 1987.
[83] Nelson, E. Warning signs of a possible collapse of contemporary mathematics.
In Infinity (eds. Michael Heller, W. Hugh Woodin), pp. 76–85. Cambridge
University Press, 2011.
[84] Pourciau, B. Newton and the notion of limit. Historia Mathematica 28
(2001), no. 1, 18–30.
[85] Reder, C. Transient behaviour of a Galton-Watson process with a large num-
ber of types. Journal of Applied Probability 40 (2003), no. 4 1007–1030.
[86] Reeder, P. Internal Set Theory and Euler’s Introductio in Analysin Infinito-
rum. MSc Thesis, Ohio State University, 2013.
34 T. B., E. B., F. H., V. K., K. K., M. K., T. N., D. S., AND S. S.
[87] Robinson, A. Non-standard analysis. Nederl. Akad. Wetensch. Proc. Ser. A
64 = Indag. Math. 23 (1961), 432–440 [reprinted in Selected Works, see
item [88], pp. 3-11]
[88] Robinson, A. Selected papers of Abraham Robinson. Vol. II. Nonstandard
analysis and philosophy. Edited and with introductions by W. A. J. Luxem-
burg and S. Ko¨rner. Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1979.
[89] Russell, B. The Principles of Mathematics. Routledge. London 1903.
[90] Ryff, J. Measure preserving transformations and rearrangements. J. Math.
Anal. Appl. 31 (1970), 449–458.
[91] Settle, T. Galilean science: essays in the mechanics and dynamics of the
Discorsi. Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1966, 288 pages.
[92] Sherry, D.; Katz, M. Infinitesimals, imaginaries, ideals, and fictions. Studia
Leibnitiana 44 (2012), no. 2, 166-192. See http://arxiv.org/abs/1304.2137
[93] Skolem, T. Peano’s axioms and models of arithmetic. In Mathematical inter-
pretation of formal systems, pp. 1–14. North-Holland Publishing Co., Ams-
terdam, 1955.
[94] Skyrms, B. Causal Necessity: A Pragmatic Investigation of the Necessity of
Laws. Yale University Press, 1980.
[95] Strømholm, P. Fermat’s methods of maxima and minima and of tangents. A
reconstruction. Arch. History Exact Sci. 5 (1968), no. 1, 47–69.
[96] Sullivan, K. Mathematical Education: The Teaching of Elementary Calculus
Using the Nonstandard Analysis Approach. Amer. Math. Monthly 83 (1976),
no. 5, 370–375.
[97] Tall, D.; Katz, M. A cognitive analysis of Cauchy’s conceptions of function,
continuity, limit, and infinitesimal, with implications for teaching the calcu-
lus. Educational Studies in Mathematics, to appear. See
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10649-014-9531-9
and http://arxiv.org/abs/1401.1468
[98] Tannery, P., Henry, C. Oeuvres de Fermat, Vol. 1 Gauthier-Villars, 1891.
[99] Tannery, P., Henry, C. Oeuvres de Fermat, Vol. 3 Gauthier-Villars, 1896.
[100] Tao, T. See the post http://terrytao.wordpress.com/2013/11/16/qualitative-probability-theory-types-and-the-g
[101] Tho, T. Equivocation in the foundations of Leibniz’s infinitesimal fictions.
Society and Politics 6 (2012), no. 2, 70–98.
[102] Weil, A. Number theory. An approach through history. From Hammurapi to
Legendre. Birkha¨user Boston, Inc., Boston, MA, 1984.
[103] Wheeler, J.: At home in the universe. Masters of Modern Physics. American
Institute of Physics, Woodbury, NY, 1994.
[104] Wiener, N. Differential space. Journal of Mathematical Physics 2 (1923),
no. 1, 131–174.
[105] Williamson, T. How probable is an infinite sequence of heads? Analysis 67
(2007), no. 3, 173–180.
[106] Wisan, W. The new science of motion: a study of Galileo’s De motu locali.
Arch. History Exact Sci. 13 (1974), 103–306.
FERMAT, LEIBNIZ, EULER, AND THE GANG 35
T. Bascelli, Via S. Caterina, 16, 36030 Montecchio P.no (VI), Italy
E-mail address : tiziana.bascelli@virgilio.it
E. Bottazzi, Dipartimento di Matematica, Universita` di Trento, Italy
E-mail address : Emanuele.Bottazzi@unitn.it
F. Herzberg, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld Uni-
versity, D-33615 Bielefeld, Germany
E-mail address : fherzberg@uni-bielefeld.de
V. Kanovei, IPPI, Moscow, and MIIT, Moscow, Russia
E-mail address : kanovei@googlemail.com
K. Katz, Department of Mathematics, Bar Ilan University, Ramat
Gan 52900 Israel
E-mail address : katzmik@macs.biu.ac.il
M. Katz, Department of Mathematics, Bar Ilan University, Ramat
Gan 52900 Israel
E-mail address : katzmik@macs.biu.ac.il
T. Nowik, Department of Mathematics, Bar Ilan University, Ramat
Gan 52900 Israel
E-mail address : tahl@math.biu.ac.il
D. Sherry, Department of Philosophy, Northern Arizona Univer-
sity, Flagstaff, AZ 86011, US
E-mail address : David.Sherry@nau.edu
S. Shnider, Department of Mathematics, Bar Ilan University, Ramat
Gan 52900 Israel
E-mail address : shnider@macs.biu.ac.il
